Lawyer as Emotional Laborer by Yakren, Sofia
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 42
2008 
Lawyer as Emotional Laborer 
Sofia Yakren 
Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sofia Yakren, Lawyer as Emotional Laborer, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 141 (2008). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol42/iss1/5 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
LAWYER AS EMOTIONAL LABORER
Sofia Yakren*
Prevailing norms of legal practice teach lawyers to detach their independent moral
judgments from their professional performance-to advocate zealously for their cli-
ents while remaining morally unaccountable agents of those clients' causes.
Although these norms have been subjected to prominent critiques by legal ethicists,
this Article analyzes them instead through the lens of "emotional labor," a socio-
logical theory positing that workers required to induce or suppress feeling in order
to sustain the outward countenance mandated by organizational rules face sub-
stantial psychological risks. By subordinating their personal feelings and values to
displays of zealous advocacy on behalf of others, lawyers, too, may face acute psy-
chological distress and professional dissatisfaction; ironically, legal practice norms
may place the heftiest psychological burden on those lawyers most oriented toward
justice. This Article explores several potential antidotes to the deleterious effects of
emotional labor on legal practitioners, including: (1) deep acting, or the process by
which a person attempts to experience the emotions that she is expected to display
(effectively, the antithesis of detachment); (2) self-selection into (or out of) the legal
profession based on certain personality traits, or self-selection into certain work en-
vironments based on one's personal values; and (3) a shift in the standard
conception of the lawyer's role toward greater moral autonomy for lawyers. Empiri-
cal researchers are called upon to generate data suggesting how best to alleviate
lawyers' emotional labor without entirely eliminating the potential usefulness of
emotional labor as a check on unethical conduct in legal practice.
I. INTRODUCTION: LAWYERS FEEL Too
No social role encourages such ambitious moral aspirations as
the lawyer's, and no social role so consistently disappoints the
aspirations it encourages.'
-William H. Simon
We are taught to be true to ourselves-to our beliefs, our values,
our hearts. Some of us enter law school to live out this maxim
through the representation of others. But we find that our chosen
profession often demands the opposite of us-that we compromise
* Sofia Yakren is a civil rights litigator at Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP in New
York City. She holds a JD from Yale Law School and a BA from Yale College. She thanks
Michelle Bazu, Boris Bershteyn, Deborah Cantrell, Amy Cocuzza and Harlon Dalton for
their encouragement and comments on earlier drafts.
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our personal attitudes and feelings when they are incongruent with
the interests of our clients, even if their interests seem unjust. This
expectation enables clients to exercise their autonomy through the
legal process,2 but it may also come at a great psychological cost to
lawyers.
As traditionally conceived, a lawyer's fundamental role is to ad-
vocate zealously on behalf of her clients, while in fact remaining
professionally detached. She is to consider herself morally unac-
countable for the means used or the ends achieved in advocacy,
because a sense of responsibility might undercut her ability to per-
form zealously. In promoting such norms, the legal profession
seeks to halt lawyers' inner conflicts, perceiving them as potentially
damaging to client interests.3 Protecting client interests from law-
yers' personal preferences may be an admirable aspiration in itself,
but one that begs a previously unasked question about trade-offs:
what happens to lawyers when they-over and over again-
subordinate their feelings and values to requisite displays of zeal-
ous advocacy on behalf of others?
It is no surprise that the legal profession expects lawyers to per-
form on unemotional terms, without questioning their ability to do
so, or the attending costs. Under what is arguably the prevailing
view in American law, emotion is "a corruptive force that .... must
be carefully cabined so that it does not bias or influence logic and
rational reasoning."4 Legal scholars have, however, slowly begun to
recognize the relevance of human psychology to a fuller under-
standing of legal systems and actors and, thereby, to envision a
more integral role for emotion in the law. For instance, these
scholars have challenged the focus on rationality and reason in the
law by exploring the role of emotions in judgments and decisions,
not as a corruptive force, but "as an equally valid and important
aspect of legal decisionmaking... ,5 These inquiries have ad-
dressed such issues as: the deficiency of cognition-based legal rules,
juries' use of the "right emotions" in decisionmaking, and humans'
ability to think rationally during emotional states.6
In recognizing that emotion is an inevitable aspect of the law,
some commentators have even shifted the spotlight to lawyers in
particular. One author applies Freudian theory to emphasize the
2. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Laujyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
3. See infra Part II.
4. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80
IND. L.J. 155, 160 (2005).
5. Id. at 160-61.
6. Id. at 161.
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need for lawyers to recognize and resolve strong emotional reac-
tions towards their clients-so that they may enhance these
relationships, and avoid adversely influencing their representa-
tions. She urges, "lawyers must acknowledge that emotional
responses are triggered in virtually every human encounter ....
[A]cceptance that they might be problematic is an essential first
step in recognizing the situations in which they may impair the
representation . .. ," With a similar emphasis on professional effi-
cacy, another author conducts a critical analysis of existing
scientific research regarding the effect of mood on negotiation,
and offers practical advice to lawyers on how they might improve
their moods for better negotiation results.9 He counsels against
simply ignoring or suppressing emotion because "the very thoughts
one tries to suppress will often come back more frequently and/or
more intensely," impairing one's cognitive skills, diminishing
physical and mental health outcomes in the long-run, and possibly
leading to worse negotiation outcomes.' °
Legal scholars have even begun to move away from viewing law-
yers as mere instruments, treating their mental health as an
endpoint worth exploring, in and of itself, rather than as a predic-
tor of occupational efficacy. For example, they have studied the
relationship between personality and job satisfaction among law-
yers, suggesting methods of practice best suited to lawyers with
certain personality traits atypical of lawyers generally (e.g., those
tending to make decisions through feeling, rather than thinking)."
Other authors have explored the "moral anxiety" afflicting lawyers,
without directly applying theories of psychology. For instance, one
scholar asks whether lawyers who represent abusive parents can
find psychic relief in a variety of moral justifications, including one
positing that lawyers behave morally even when they set aside their
own values to advance those of their clients because they do so in
the name of client autonomy.12
7. See Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client
Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 260-74 (1999).
8. Id. at 276.
9. See Clark Freshman et al., The Lawyer-Negotiator As Mood Scientist: What We Know and
Don't Know About How Mood Relates to Successful Negotiation, 2002J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 4.
10. Id. at 67.
11. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Richard, Psychological Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing
Lawyers in the United States, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 979 (2002); Susan Daicoff, Making Law Thera-
peutic for Lawyers: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and the Psychology of Lawyers, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 811 (1999).
12. See Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers," "Good Lawyers, " and "Legal Ethics, " 81 GEO. L.J. 2533,
2539 (1993).
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Lawyers provide fertile ground for the application of socio-
psychological 13 theories because, as the profession breeds formalis-
tic reasoning and repression of emotions, "[t]hat disconnect
between being a human being and a technician causes pain and
drives people out of the profession."1 4 Accordingly, despite car-
toons depicting lawyers as unfeeling technocrats,1 5 there is
evidence that lawyers experience psychological angst-at rates sig-
nificantly greater than average.16 A 1995 study found that
depression, anxiety, social isolation and alienation, hostility, para-
noid ideation, and obsessive-compulsive symptoms are more
prevalent among attorneys than in the general population.17 Addi-
tionally, studies show that lawyers are anywhere from three to thirty
times as likely as the general population to suffer from substance
abuse problems, including alcoholism.' Legal education and prac-
tice have something to do with these poor mental health outcomes:
a 1986 study revealed that, while only about ten percent of enter-
ing law students exhibited significant symptoms of psychological
distress, thirty-two percent did so by the end of their first year of
law school, and forty percent by the end of their third year.' 9 Al-
though this percentage decreased to 17.9 two years after
graduation,0 it appears that lawyers do not return to their pre-law
school level of psychological health. In addition, in the period
13. This Article invokes the language of psychology in reference to lawyer angst. How-
ever, assuming that, at the most basic level, psychology is the science of the individual and
sociology the science of society, this Article in fact lies at the intersection of the two fields by
examining the psychological impact of legal culture on individual lawyers. Citing to psy-
chologists and sociologists alike, the Article analyzes legal practice through a socio-
psychological lens.
14. Elaine McArdle, From Ballistic to Holistic, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2004, Maga-
zine, at 14, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/magazine/articles/2004/01/
11/from ballistic to holistic/.
15. See, e.g., THE NEW YORKER, THE NEW YORKER BOOK OF LAWYER CARTOONS I (Al-
fred A. Knopf ed., 1993) ("I consider myself a passionate man, but, of course, a lawyer
first.").
16. PatrickJ. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Un-
healthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871, 874-88 (1999).
17. Connie J. A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Concerns Among a Sample of
Practicing Lauyers, 10J.L. & HEALTH 1, 49-50 (1995-96).
18. See Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lauyers Change? A
Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney
Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 555 (1998) (citing Michael A. Bloom &
Carol Lynn Wallinger, Lauyers and Alcoholism: Is it Time For a New Approach?, 61 TEMP. L. REV.
1409 (1988); Andrew V. Hansen, Alcoholism in the Lawyer's Context, 7 LEGAL REF. SERV. Q. 231,
236 (1987)).
19. See Daicoff supra note 18, at 556 (citing G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Preva-
lence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Attorneys, 13 INT.J. LAW
& PSYCHIATRY 233, 234 (1990)).
20. See Daicoff, supra note 18, at 556.
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since a 1984 study by the American Bar Association (ABA), practic-
ing lawyers have reported rising levels of job dissatisfaction.2' By
1990, dissatisfaction had doubled for lawyers in private practice,
and levels of satisfaction had plummeted for the most satisfied law-
yers, as well. According to a 2005 NALP Foundation study, the
majority of surveyed attorneys reported that they "felt stressed and
fatigued most of the time.
2
Countless factors might contribute to lawyers' psychological
struggles. But, surprisingly, legal scholars have omitted an essential
contender by failing to explore-from an emotional labor perspec-
tive-what unique features of the legal profession may be
accountable for lawyers' mental health problems. This Article fo-
cuses on the fundamental, yet previously unelaborated, issues of
how and why certain legal practice norms-particularly, zealous
advocacy and moral non-accountability-may cause lawyers psycho-
logical distress. In doing so, this Article implicidy embraces
"therapeutic jurisprudence," a conceptual framework designed to
study "the extent to which substantive rules, legal procedures, and
the roles of lawyers and judges produce therapeutic or antithera-
peutic consequences.,,24
Accordingly, in Part II, I set out the standards of professional
conduct traditionally imposed on lawyers. In Part III, I describe the
sociological theory of emotional labor, which posits that organiza-
tionally-defined behavior norms require workers to manipulate
their emotions in ways that cause psychological distress. I then ap-
ply the theory specifically to lawyers, asking: how are lawyers
impacted when they feel negative, or even just ambiguous, about a
particular client, case or legal strategy because their action may
lead to injustice, yet professional role requirements instruct them
to detach from these feelings and undertake zealous representa-
tion anyway? I conclude that emotional labor theory teaches what
the legal profession has neglected to perceive-that a lawyer in
such a position must strain to exhibit the requisite outward expres-
sions despite her personal feelings, and, in some cases, will suffer
long-term psychological damage as a result. Finally, in Part IV, I
explore ways to reduce the negative effects of lawyers' emotional
labor, including deep acting to align felt emotions with expected
21. See Richard, supra note 11, at 984 (citing Am. BAR ASS'N, THE STATE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 1990 (1991)).
22. See Richard, supra note 11, at 984.
23. SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY, IN PURSUIT OF ATTORNEY WORK-LIFE BALANCE: BEST PRAC-
TICES IN MANAGEMENT 97 (Paula Patton ed., 2005).
24. David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic jurisprudence as a New Approach to
Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979,981 (1991).
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ones, self-selection into the legal profession and particular work
environments, and the expansion of moral autonomy in legal prac-
tice.
Emotional labor is relevant to a discussion of lawyering because
it is endemic to it, despite traditional efforts to exile emotion from
legal thought. The vast majority of lawyers likely expend such effort
on a regular basis, even as they are urged to detach by a legal pro-
fession that remains seemingly oblivious to their struggles, and as
social scientists fail to provide the necessary empirical research to
spur intelligent change. Furthermore, if empirically proven, the
disconnect between lawyers' personal values and their professional
role requirements may be a sign, not only of mental health risks,
but also of the need to make legal practice a more ethically sound
experience. Because of lawyers' unique function in society, their
emotional labor has implications distinct from that of other work-
ers who have been central in the psychology literature to this point.
Although there are a variety of ways to address the ramifications of
emotional labor, this Article theorizes that the best solution in the
name of both lawyer wellness and professional ethics is to recon-
sider the standard conception of the lawyer's role. As it stands right
now, the legal profession may be undermining itself by driving out
those lawyers most oriented toward justice.
II. ZEALOUS ADvoCACY AND NON-ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION: ESTABLISHING THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN PERSON AND PROFESSIONAL
A. Standard Conception of the Lawyer's Role
David Luban describes the "standard conception" of the lawyer's
role as embodying two principles according to the profession's of-
ficial codes and unofficial mores: 1) partisanship, such that "[a]
lawyer must, within the established constraints on professional be-
havior, maximize the likelihood that the client's objectives will be
attained," and 2) non-accountability, such that " [i]n representing a
client, a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally ac-
countable for the means used or the ends achieved."
2
Since their inception, ABA standards of professional conduct for
lawyers have promoted the partisanship value. 6 Through the
25. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lauryer-Client Relationship: A
Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004, 1004 (1990).
26. The first national standards for lawyers were the Canons of Professional Ethics,
adopted by the ABA in 1908. In 1969, the ABA replaced the Canons with the Model Code of
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roughly interchangeable language of zealous advocacy borrowed
from Canon 15 of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 7
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code)
reflects the principle of partisanship: "A lawyer should represent a
client zealously within the bounds of the law. 27 Comment 1 to Rule
1.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules),
which governs lawyers today, similarly states:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite
opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the law-
yer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are
required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests
of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf2
Luban warns that confining zealous advocacy within the bounds of
the law does not preclude problems of morality, for "[t] he limits of
the law inevitably lie beyond moral limits, and zealous advocacy
,,29always means zeal at the margin.
William Simon, thus, describes the "prevailing approach to law-
yers' ethics"-what he calls the "Dominant View"-as follows: "the
lawyer must-or at least may-pursue any goal of the client
through any arguably legal course of action and assert any non-
frivolous legal claim." ° The Dominant View, reflected in the bar's
disciplinary codes, the case law on lawyer discipline, and the com-
mentary on professional responsibility, makes loyalty to the client
the only ethical duty distinctive to the lawyer's role,1 imposing "no
responsibility to third parties or the public different from that of
the minimal compliance with law that is required of everyone.22
Simon poignantly diagnoses the problem attending such unquali-
fied zeal: "If I am right, the key source of moral anxiety [among
lawyers] is the perceived tenuousness of the connection between
the concrete immediate injustices of practice and the remote jus-
tice that is supposed to redeem them., 3 The purpose of this Article
Professional Responsibility, and, in 1983, it adopted the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct to replace the Code. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preface (2004).
27. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980); see also DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE 11 (1988).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2008) (emphasis added).
29. David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 89 (David
Luban ed., 1983).
30. SIMON, supra note 1, at 7.
31. See id. at 7-8
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id. at 3.
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is to explain the emotional processes underlying lawyers' moral
anxieties, so that we may pursue psychologically sound solutions.
Despite common perception to the contrary, the principle of
partisanship (arguably, often in tension with morality) does not
apply only to litigators. While many transactional business lawyers
deny this, "the principle of partisanship is generally taken as a
credo by lawyers in nonadvocate roles just as much as by court-
room lawyers." 4 Thus, the legal profession instructs lawyers, in
whatever setting, to place client directions-even morally ques-
tionable ones-above their own beliefs.35
Such a broadly applicable, client-oriented tenet of professional
conduct can be disconcerting in that "it sets aside the question of
whether the client should prevail," turning the lawyer into a mere
instrument of her client's interests, regardless of whether these in-
terests seem just.36 Dramatic outlying examples aside, Luban notes
that "all litigators have had cases where, in their heart of hearts,
they wanted their client to lose or wished that a distasteful action
did not need to be performed," but they had to ignore the exter-
nalities of their advocacy in order to serve their clients.
3 7
Partisanship begins to look even more like corrupt instrumental-
ism as Luban paints a picture in which "the lawyer's art is to
manipulate arguments about law and fact (within the established
constraints ... )-to bend, fold, and spindle, if not mutilate, the
facts and the law ... [and thereby] [t] he lawyer either cheats her
way to justice or cheats justice. '" This intentional caricature illus-
trates the source of our "nagging disquiet" over the principle of
partisanship: through "instrumental morality," the legal profession
undermines the authority of the law.39
Ironically, the legal profession manages to uphold a principle of
conduct that enables lawyers to assert morally unsupportable legal
interests by seeking a greater social good-justice. The underlying
assumption is that the adversary system, supposedly the best way of
attaining justice, will not work properly unless each lawyer presents
her side, just or unjust, as zealously as possible. 40 By the same to-
34. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 11.
35. See id. at 12.
36. Id. at 12-13.
37. Luban, supra note 29, at 87.
38. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 13, 15.
39. Id. at 15-16.
40. See Luban, supra note 29, at 89; see also Ashe, supra note 12, 2546-47 (recognizing
traditional justifications "in support of the role adopted by the lawyer representing a parent
charged with child abuse ... [include] the lawyer's playing an essential role in a somewhat
imperfect but basically good 'system,'" or, more likely "the defense lawyer's fairly firm con-
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ken, the adversary system serves as a justification for the non-
accountability prong of the standard conception of the lawyer's
role because lawyers who are held accountable for their actions
"will be morally obliged to restrain their zeal whenever they find
that the 'means used or the ends achieved' in the advocacy are
morally wrong," in violation of the partisanship ideal.4'
Although, technically, rationales based on the adversarial model
hold within the context of adjudication only, if at all, lawyers
"commonly act as though ... [the] two principles characterized
their relationship with clients even when the representations do
not involve the courtroom."2 Furthermore, Luban urges, "[e]ven
lawyers with nothing good to say about the legal system in general
believe that their current actions are justified or excused by the
nature of the adversary system. 4 3 He considers the "universal ac-
ceptance among lawyers of the Justification of the Adversary
System [] a startling thing, a marvelous thing, a thing to behold,"
and criticizes lawyers for failing to question the justification, par-
ticularly since their moral redemption hinges on the effectiveness
of the adversary system-the degree to which it can truly deliver on
that greater good we call justice-which remains an open empiri-
cal question.4
Interestingly, though Luban does not believe that lawyers should
fully separate their personal and professional identities ("when
professional and moral obligation conflict, moral obligation takes
precedence") , he suggests that they nonetheless are able to do so
with ease, by simply embracing the non-accountability principle.
And he makes this conclusion despite recognizing that all lawyers
have clients whom, in their "heart of hearts,"4 6 they would rather
not represent.
Along these lines, the American Law Institute (ALI), in allowing
lawyers the autonomy to express their political views, assumes that
they can and should professionally detach, so as to cabin their per-
sonal political views from their client representations:
In general, a lawyer may publicly take personal positions on
controversial issues without regard to whether the positions
viction that she does something positively good by resisting the operation of a 'system' that is
itself perverse or skewed in its unjust operation against the accused.").
41. Luban, supra note 29, at 90.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 89.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 118.
46. Id. at 87.
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are consistent with those of some or all of the lawyer's clients.
Consent of the lawyer's clients is not required. Lawyers usually
represent many clients, and professional detachment is one of
the qualities a lawyer brings to each client. Moreover, it is a
tradition that a lawyer's advocacy for a client should not be
construed as an expression of the lawyer's personal views.47
Similarly, the ABA Model Rules implicitly presume that lawyers can
seamlessly separate conflicting personal views and professional ac-
tions: "A lawyer's representation of a client, including
representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorse-
ment of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities."4" The ABA Model Code, though no longer in effect, re-
veals the timeless saliency of this presumption in professional
standards for lawyers:
The obligation of loyalty to his client applies only to a lawyer
in the discharge of his professional duties and implies no ob-
ligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the
interests or desires of his client. While a lawyer must act always
with circumspection in order that his conduct will not ad-
versely affect the rights of a client in a matter he is then
handling, he may take positions on public issues and espouse
legal reforms he favors without regard to the individual views
of any client.
4 9
At first glance, detachment appears a fair trade-off for the law-
yer's right to maintain personal political views-but does human
psychology work so simply? If Luban and Simon are right, the
standard conception of the lawyer's role is to serve her client ex-
clusively by going to the oft-immoral limits of the law, all the while
blocking out negative third-party externalities. Intuition counsels
that many human beings operating in such a capacity will experi-
ence discomfort as their actions conflict with their own sense of
morality. Nonetheless, when the legal profession nonchalantly
counsels lawyers to invoke detachment in order to advocate zeal-
ously regardless of how they feel about a case or a client, it assumes
implicitly either that lawyers are able to comply without negative
consequence, or that it is their professional obligation to pay a psy-
chological price. Either way, the legal profession fails to
47. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 125e (2000) (em-
phasis added).
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2008).
49. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-17 (1980).
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acknowledge explicitly the emotional hardships potentially attend-
ing the process of compromising one's personal identity for
professional role.
These emotional hardships may be conceptualized in two ways:
1) in terms of the risks of achieving severance of personal and pro-
fessional identity, if a lawyer is willing and/or able to cope with
inner conflict by detaching, and 2) in terms of the costs of existing
in a state of conflict between personal and professional self, if a
lawyer is unwilling and/or unable to detach. In theory, complete
detachment and full-fledged inner conflict represent two end-
points on the same spectrum as a lawyer struggles to cope with
divergent personal values and professional expectations.
The following section explains that the first conceptualization-
the impact of detachment on the mental health of lawyers-has
already been addressed in the literature. The remainder of the Ar-
ticle then focuses on the second conceptualization, arguing that a
lawyer experiencing tension between the partisanship principle
and her personal preferences, values, or morals, despite the de-
tachment mandate, performs emotional labor and may therefore
suffer psychological strain. Undue focus on detachment as a solu-
tion to the lawyer's personal-professional conflict deflects attention
away from this potentially elucidating perspective.
Before proceeding further, one disclaimer is in order. Some
scholars may wonder whether professional norms fully embody the
standard conception of the lawyer's role, or question whether the
standard conception is truly pervasive in the world of legal prac-
tice. As for the former issue, even Luban concedes that the Model
Code and Model Rules are more complex than his standard con-
ception suggests in that they seek to "mitigate the more repugnant
implications of partisanship and non-accountability."50 He ulti-
mately concludes, however, that these attempts at mitigation still
leave lawyers only one option if a client adamantly insists on a
morally repugnant course of action-resignation5 Since the fre-
quency with which questions of morality arise in legal practice
would seem to exceed significantly the frequency of resignations,
the standard conception remains relevant.
Meanwhile, the latter question is an empirical one that currently
has no clear answer, but one that Luban addresses at least anecdo-
tally to suggest that lawyers overwhelmingly embrace the standard
conception. Of course, with more recent trends in the law, such as
50. LUBAN, supra note 27, at 394.
51. See id. at 395.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35, 42-44.
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alternative dispute resolution, the issue warrants revisiting. None-
theless, one need not imagine the most pervasive and extreme
version of partisanship to recognize that conflicts between client
interests and lawyer values occur frequently enough in daily prac-
tice to make lawyering emotionally daunting. In addition, even if
lawyers are not fully embracing the partisanship ideal, they may be
struggling as a result of its demands on their identity, as explored
in Part IV.A.1. In short, this Article amplifies the potential conflict
between zealous advocacy and personal morality in order to draw
attention to a plausible-and not unlikely-source of lawyer angst.
The precise extent to which this is a real world problem must be
explored empirically, and is a question for another day.
B. Detachment and the Lawyer's Conflict
Literature analyzing the legal profession's answer to lawyers'
personal-professional conflicts perceives a deeper, potentially more
disabling, psychological danger than the legal profession likes to
admit. For instance, Gerald J. Postema argues that, by requiring
certain personal qualities, the professional role defines an identity
or self-image for its occupant not readily severable from the rest of
her identity. It is necessary to explore the relationship between the
professional self and the character of the person occupying the
role because:
Traits of character are traits of whole persons-that is, of
agents who in their actions express and realize a conception
of self, and who therefore both are expected and fervently
seek to integrate these traits into a coherent and feasible con-
ception of self. Because of this, the question of what set of
dispositions is desirable in an incumbant [sic] in the [profes-
sional] role cannot be separated from the intensely personal
question of whether a relatively good person can fill the role
and live an integrated life without shame. 3
Unlike Luban, the ALI, or the ABA, Postema explicitly acknowl-
edges that people cannot detach their professional identities from
their personal ones without great personal cost. In considering
"how lawyers may come to terms with the apparent threat posed by
their professional role to their moral integrity," he concludes that
53. Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in Ta GOOD
LAWYER, supra note 29, at 286, 287-88.
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the conception of professional role embodying "principles of parti-
sanship and neutrality" is "deeply defective" because it actively
encourages lawyers to adopt "detachment strategies at the expense
of the development and exercise of mature, responsible moral
",51judgment ....
Just as the "standard conception" of the lawyer's role instructs,
lawyers employing "detachment strategies seek to detach the self
from the role [and] to define the self in such a way that the morally
problematic aspects of the role do not reflect on it."55 One method
of detachment entails dissociating the private personality from the
professional one, and treating them as entirely separate selves
("schizophrenic strategy"). 6 The other method involves regarding
professional experiences as having no relationship with the self at
all ("restricted identification strategy"). This is best explained by
the quote, "an honest man is not responsible for the vices of his call-
ing. , 7 Either way, the private identity takes no responsibility for the
moral wrongs of the professional activity.51
Even though "an active conscience can be costly,"59 Postema ar-
gues that the alternative-"schizophrenic strategy"-comes at too
great a personal cost to lawyers, not because everyone experiences
disunity as psychological discomfort (in fact, extreme detachment
is marked by the absence of anxiety or conflict), but because it re-
sults in no self at all:
A necessary condition of a healthy self-concept, of a whole
and harmonious self, is the awareness that the elements of
practical experience are internally related, in the sense that
they bear on each other, that they can conflict or comple-
ment, threaten or reciprocally support each other, and that
the individual, the self, has a definite stake in the outcome.
Self-consciousness, then, is a necessary condition of the self.60
This absence of self-consciousness is possible to achieve. It ac-
counts for Eichmann's role in the Nazi regime (a most extreme
example, of course) and the ease with which he adopted divergent,
even monstrous, practices.6' And, in achieving it, an individual
54. Id. at 288-89.
55. Id. at 291-92.
56. See id. at 292.
57. See id. (attributing quote to Renaissance author Michel de Montaigne).
58. See id. at 292-93.
59. Id. at 293.
60. Id. at 297.
61. See id. at 294-95, 297.
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faces personal costs, including radical self-deception, incoherence,
and alienation from the interpersonal world. 2
The "restricted identification strategy" is less extreme than the
"schizophrenic strategy" in that it allows for unity of self by relegat-
ing conflicting experiences entirely outside of the self, rather than
to a separate professional self-as if the person does not identify
with those experiences at all. However, Postema urges that "it is a
grave mistake to regard determination of the self's boundaries as
strictly a subjective matter ....,,6 Since a person chooses to be-
come a lawyer, it is impossible for her simply to avoid identifying
with her activities in the role. 4 In addition, lawyers constantly have
the opportunity to exercise power, which is a source of personal
self-expression and pleasure.6' One cannot feel emotions about
such activities without seeing them as a reflection on oneself; "even
the most detached lawyer will feel pride, or a sense of fulfillment or
frustration, regarding his or her performance of regular responsi-
bilities of the role.""" Furthermore, the fact that any morally
problematic ends can be ascribed to the client's direct intent does
not remove responsibility from the lawyer because:
The agent is not simply his or her intentions; the self is not
simply the product of actions issuing from intentions ....
[Elach is tied with manifold knots to the world and other
selves. To seek to disentangle the self from these ties ... is
impossible; to claim that one has effectively done so is either
bad faith or self-deception.7
The professional detachment mandate treats lawyers like mere
agents, when in fact they may often, and inevitably, feel more like
culpable principals.
However hyperbolic and theoretical Postema's analysis may
seem, he sheds light on the fact that the standard conception of
the lawyer's role places difficult, and often unattainable, psycho-
logical demands on lawyers-urging them to brush off
accountability by detaching from their professional selves, so that
they may be fully partisan on behalf of their clients, rather than
helping them deal effectively with the complexities of professional
life. In passing, Postema poses inner conflict ("disintegrated con-
62. Id. at 298-99.
63. Id. at 299.
64. See id. at 300.
65. See id. at 301.
66. Id. at 301.
67. Id. at 304.
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sciousness") between personal morality and professional duty as an
alternative better than detachment because at least it aspires, in all
its self-consciousness, to unity of the soul.6 s The subject of this Arti-
cle is this very inner struggle in the face of partisanship demands.
The personal-professional conflict seems more likely than com-
plete detachment to afflict lawyers broadly, given the psychological
incapacitation of "schizophrenic strategy" and the impracticability
of successfully implementing "restrictive identity strategy." At the
very least, it affects enough lawyers-at one poignant moment or
another-to matter. Inner conflict comes with its own share of psy-
chological costs to lawyers, and it is potentially exacerbated by the
drive toward detachment. In a legal culture that pits professional
against personal, we must weigh the debilitating effects of detach-
ment as a coping mechanism against the costs of living in conflict
and other possible alternatives. 69
III. THE LAWYER'S INNER CONFLICT: AN EMOTIONAL
LABOR PERSPECTIVE
I try to define why I return, as I always do, to representing
'bad mothers'-although sometimes those 'cases' exhaust me,
wear me down, make me depressed, make me angry, leave me
spiritually depleted, and therefore make me ask: Why am I do-
ing this?
70
-Marie Ashe
There is something odd when a lapsed lawyer writes about the
practice of law, but I've got something to get off my chest. I
didn't like some of the things I did as a lawyer. I took positions
I didn't believe in. I made arguments that I thought bordered
on untrue. I postured. I bluffed. I pursued advantages pro-
vided more by clients' resources than the value of their
claims. And, I found out that doing the things that lawyers
68. See id. at 295-96.
69. Less extreme forms of detachment may be a relatively healthy alternative for law-
yers, and this point is explored furthered in Part ]VA However, Postema's extreme
theoretical construct provides a good context for thinking about professional-personal con-
flict.
70. Ashe, supra note 12, at 2565.
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do-ethical things!-can be painful. The problem is, I didn't
71learn this lesson until I became a lawyer.
-Richard Matasar
Though their prevalence is nearly impossible to quantify, many
lawyers appear to exist in painful conflict with their professional
selves. Ashe and Matasar are examples, continuing to own their
internal angst because they are unable or unwilling to adhere to
the profession's detachment recommendation. At times, I have
stood among them, frankly, in greater fear of detachment than the
alternative, for as long as I struggle, I continue to possess myself.
During the summer after my second year of law school, I struggled
to make sense of the mandate of zealous advocacy in the face of a
gut that refused to comply. I knew that my client, a woman suffer-
ing from serious mental illness, deserved representation against
the psychiatric center that sought to commit her. But did I natu-
rally feel zealous on her behalf? No. Her situation was so awfully
textured and ambiguous that no one could know whether she
should stay or go-at least not without reservation. So I felt doubt
about her best interests and about her understanding of her own
best interests. To pretend that I knew the right path with zeal
caused me pain-no rule of professional detachment or non-
accountability was going to spare me that. I felt like I was defying
truth, rather than seeking it, and leaving the final answer to the
judge, or to the system, left me no less implicated in my heart. In
the end, I stood up in court and argued her case with the requisite
zeal-and even felt good about it-but to pretend that the process
was not emotionally daunting would be to cheat lawyers of an ex-
planation (albeit partial) for their troubles.
Lawyers' inner conflicts can take different forms. A lawyer like
Ashe, representing abusive mothers, may consider her clients mor-
ally repugnant, feel concern about the best interests of their
children, and thereby fear facilitating her clients' abusive patterns
through advocacy. A discomfort akin to Matasar's takes on the
somewhat different focus of questionable advocacy tactics-
bluffing, posturing, telling half-truths-though deemed ethical, or
at least not unethical, by the profession-feel wrong to him. My
scenario falls somewhere in-between-while I did not consider my
client morally repugnant, I was concerned about the potential ex-
71. Richard A. Matasar, The Pain of Moral Laryering, 75 IowA L. REv. 975, 975 (1990).
72. This is not to say that lawyers never feel pride and consonance about their work,
but the upside of legal practice is not the subject of this Article.
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ternalities that my role did not allow me to address. All three of us
have in common a strong sense of accountability for furthering
some sort of potentially bad end-be it endangering a child, re-
leasing a patient to greater harm in the community, or engaging in
a system that promotes morally suspect advocacy tactics. And the
legal profession currently provides no satisfying response to such
lawyer concerns.
Assuming that professional norms condone amoral conduct in
certain scenarios, we may be concerned as a society that lawyer dis-
comfort in the face of role expectations warns of potential affronts
to commonly understood notions of morality.73 This Article focuses
on the emotional labor attending such inner conflict, even though
additional conceptualizations of how lawyers perform emotional1 4
labor are possible, because it is endemic to the very principles of
the legal profession and has potential societal ramifications in its
capacity to sound warning bells about unethical professional con-
duct.
In employing the emotional labor framework, which is described
in the next section, this Article begins to provide the answers that
73. A lawyer conceivably could experience inner conflict for relatively idiosyncratic
reasons. Though conflict of any sort, regardless of its origin, could result in psychological
harm, this Article is particularly concerned with the type of conflict that signals moral com-
promise because of its implications for the legitimacy of the legal profession.
74. Arlie Russell Hochschild addresses the emotional labor of lawyers in only one
paragraph of her book. See ARLIE R. HOCHSCIIILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZA-
TION OF HUMAN FEELING 151-52 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2003) (1983). In this brief discussion,
she acknowledges that lawyers must work to produce an emotional state in their clients. See
id. For instance, "[d]ivorce lawyers... must try to induce calmness in angry and despairing
clients, who may want to escalate instead of conclude a battle over money, property, and
children." Id. at 151. This example reflects how lawyers may have to employ emotional labor
in seeking to shape their clients' goals-an attempt which, if successful, could possibly re-
solve a conflict between what the lawyer feels is right and what the client wants to achieve.
However, the illustration fails to convey the specific labor involved when a lawyer must be-
tray her own feelings to advocate zealously for a client who, sa); refuses to adjust her goals,
or who a lawyer does not even seek to influence out of respect for the client's autonomy.
As a second example, Hochschild describes lawyers who specialize in wills, and are swept
into family disputes and forced to take stances that seem unfair (in their effect on other
members of the family) on behalf of their clients. See id. at 151-52. Interestingly, again she
highlights the fact that the trusts and estates lawyer "risks becoming the butt of someone's
anger, while at the same time he must maintain the trust of everyone involved," rather than
on the work involved in posing as a zealous advocate for an arrangement he believes to be
unfair. Id. at 152.
Thus, while Hochschild recognizes that "[p]sychiatrists, social workers, and ministers, for
example, are expected to feel concern, to empathize, and yet to avoid 'too much' liking or
disliking," she does not provide a comparable portrait of the emotion work behind the ex-
pectation that lawyers argue their cases with zeal and simultaneous professional detachment.
Id. at 150. The emotion work involved in carrying out zealous advocacy in the face of inner
conflict is the focus of this Article-emphasizing that emotion work is endemic to the very
principles of the legal profession.
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some lawyers crave. Matasar reveals that, "[a]s a lawyer, I barely
recognized why practice was so emotionally testing; I'm still not
sure I fully understand."7' Since he is probably not wondering
alone, it is high time we operationalized lawyers' unease. What are
the processes underlying Ashe's vague sense of spiritual depletion,
or Matasar's ill-comprehended pain? Through the interconnected
lenses of human psychology and sociology, the subsequent sections
present an account of lawyers' struggles with the principles of par-
tisanship and non-accountability-an account not about morality
in the abstract, but about what happens when lawyers' emotions
conflict with their professional duties. How do lawyers fare when
they have not attained the detachment ideal-which I suspect that
most lawyers cannot readily do-and must contend daily with con-
flicts, large or small, between personal and professional self? What
happens when a lawyer asks the question that partisanship does not
allow: should my client prevail?
Part A provides the necessary background on emotional labor by
defining the concept, describing how it works, and explaining its
dangers. Meanwhile, Part B applies the theory of emotional labor
directly to the legal profession.
A. Emotional Labor Theory Generally
1. Emotional Labor: How It Is Defined
Arlie Russell Hochschild introduced the concept of "emotional
labor" in 1983.76 In studying flight attendants, she found that, in
addition to commonly recognized physical and mental exertions,
such as pushing heavy meal carts or organizing emergency evacua-
tions, their work entails emotional labor.7 ' Emotional labor
"requires one to induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the
[organizationally desired] outward countenance that produces the
proper state of mind in others-in this case [of flight attendants],
75. Matasar, supra note 71, at 975.
76. See Dieter Zapf, Emotion Work and Psychological Well-Being: A Review of the Literature
and Some Conceptual Considerations, 12 HuM. RES. MGMT. REv. 237, 238 (2002) (referencing
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74). As a sociologist, Hochschild distinguished between "emotional
labor" and "emotion work," defining the former as the exchange value of work sold for a
wage and the latter as the use value of such work in the private context. Psychologists tend to
use "work," instead of "labor," to describe individual behavior and intrapsychic concepts as
opposed to management relations. See id. at 238-39. Although I rely largely on psychological
studies, I use the terms "emotional labor" and "emotion work" interchangeably.
77. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 6-7.
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the sense of being cared for in a convivial and safe place.""8 The
process is generally defined by three factors: 1) the work occurs in
interactions with clients (face-to-face, or voice-to-voice); 2) "emo-
tions are displayed to influence other people's emotions, attitudes,
and behaviors; and [3)] the display of emotions has to follow cer-
tain rules."79 For example, airlines train novice flight attendants to
smile for their patrons, so that they appear friendly and cheerful
no matter how tired they feel or how aggressively their passengers
behave, ° because this is part of the service: "the value of a personal
smile is groomed to reflect the company's disposition-its confi-
dence that its planes will not crash, its reassurance that departures
and arrivals will be on time, its welcome and its invitation to re-
turn." l While organizational psychologists have focused on the
"physical and cognitive aspects of work since the beginning of [the
twentieth] century," researchers only recently began to study emo-
tional work demands.2
2. Emotional Labor: How It Is Shaped
Rules or standards of behavior indicating which emotions are
appropriate in given situations and how they should be expressed
publicly-called "display rules" or "feeling rules"-guide emotion
work. 3 Some companies, including Delta Airlines, Disney, and
McDonald's, explicitly provide such rules to their employees. 4 For
example, Walt Disney World uses classes, handbooks, and bill-
boards to teach new employees "exactly which positive and esteem-
enhancing emotions they must convey to 'guests' at Walt Disney
World. 5
In contrast, professionals are thought typically to supervise their
own emotion work in light of informal professional norms and
78. Id. at 7.
79. Zapf, supra note 76, at 239.
80. As discussed further below, there is believed to be some emotional labor involved
even when an individual's felt emotion is congruent with the organizationally desired emo-
tion because of the effort involved in ensuring that the felt emotion is expressed in an
organizationally appropriate way. SeeJ. Andrew Morris & Daniel C. Feldman, The Dimensions,
Antecedents, and Consequences of Emotional Labor, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 986, 988 (1996).
81. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 4.
82. Zapf, supra note 76, at 238.
83. Id. at 241. Hochschild called these "feeling rules" because she considered the
management of inner feelings to be crucial to the process of emotional labor, whereas re-
searchers who emphasize outer expression prefer the term "display rules." Id.
84. See id.
85. J. Andrew Morris & Daniel C. Feldman, Managing Emotions in the Workplace, 9J. OF
MANAGERIAL IssuEs 257, 259 (1997).
FALL 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
client expectations. 6 There is no doubt that most lawyers have
greater job autonomy than most McDonald's employees. However,
the standard conception of the lawyer's role, as embodied by pro-
fessional standards governing lawyers, sends more than an
informal message to lawyers about how they should be handling
their emotions. Part III.B addresses feeling rules for lawyers in
greater depth.
3. Emotional Labor: How It Is Done
Workers may perform emotional labor under two different sce-
narios. First, researchers believe that individuals experience a
relatively mild form of emotional labor even in situations where
there is congruence between their felt emotions and the organiza-
tionally desired emotions because they "still have to exert some
effort to ensure that what is felt will be displayed in organization-
ally appropriate ways (i.e., that the feeling of happiness is displayed
in an appropriate smile or greeting) ."8 Second, when individuals'
felt emotions are incongruent with display rules, they expend
greater effort on emotional labor than their counterparts in the
89first scenario .
This Article is concerned with lawyers' experience of the second
condition because it is more onerous than the first and probably
fairly common. Many service workers report a discrepancy between
what they actually feel and the emotions they are expected to dis-
play.90 Such a divergence of feeling and rule is widespread because:
[E] motions are often involuntary (e.g., a doctor feels momen-
tary disgust at the sight of a deformed person), they often lag
behind situational cues (e.g., an upset company lawyer enters
a meeting where she is expected to be emotionally neutral),
and they are subject to situational stressors, mood, fatigue,
and other factors besides normative demands.9'
86. SeeHoCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 154.
87. See supra Part IL.A (defining "standard conception" of lawyer's role); infra Part
llI.B.1 (addressing in greater depth lawyers' "feeling rules").
88. Morris & Feldman, supra note 80, at 988; see also Blake E. Ashforth & Ronald H.
Humphrey, Emotional Labor in Service Roles: The Influence of Identity, 18 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 88,
94 (1993).
89. See Morris & Feldman, supra note 80, at 988.
90. SeeJeroen Jansz & Monique Timmers, Emotional Dissonance: When the Experience of an
Emotion Jeopardizes an Individual's Identity, 12 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 79, 86 (2002).
91. Ashforth & Humphrey, supra note 88, at 97.
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Thus, feeling rules cannot regulate actual experience. Although
there are differences, such as status, in the occupational experi-
ences of service workers and lawyers, it is reasonable to assume that
lawyers also encounter a disconnect between their true emotions
and feeling rule requirements under certain circumstances.
So how exactly do employees perform emotional labor when
their true feelings are different from what feeling rules dictate?
Hochschild argues that service providers comply with feeling rules
through surface or deep acting.9 Surface acting involves the use of
cues, such as facial expressions, gestures, and voice tone, to feign
emotions that are not actually felt.94 Subsequent researchers have
identified that employees can surface act by "faking in good faith"
or "faking in bad faith," as discussed further in Part III.B.2.9' Since
surface acting maintains the disconnect between true feeling and
emotional display, it is associated with high emotional dissonance.
9 6
Deep acting is the means by which a person attempts to experi-
ence the emotions that she is expected to display. She may actively
seek to evoke or suppress a feeling (e.g., a flight attendant mentally
coaching herself to stay calm despite a passenger's irritating behav-
ior), or use her imagination to summon thoughts or memories that
she associates with the sought emotion.97 Given the effort employ-
ees must exert to achieve alignment between diverging inner and
expressed feelings, deep acting has been associated with emotional
effort rather than dissonance. 98
4. Emotional Labor: Why it Matters
Although emotional labor has such benefits as improving cus-
tomer service, researchers have recognized that "[w]hat is
functional for the organization and customer may well be dysfunc-
tional for the service provider."" While, in one sense, the flight
attendant's requisite smile and all its symbolism simply provides a
service, in another, "it estranges [a] worker[] from [her] own
smile[] ... " for she no longer expresses what she actually feels in
the moment. ° For instance, one flight attendant in Hochschild's
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 33, 35-55.
94. See id. at 92-93.
95. Id. at 93.
96. See Zapf, supra note 76, at 245; see also infra Part III.A.4.
97. See Ashforth & Humphrey, supra note 88, at 93.
98. See Zapf, supra note 76, at 245; see also infra Part 1V.A.
99. Ashforth & Humphrey, supra note 88, at 96.
100. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 5.
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study describes the difficulty of escaping the effects of her "profes-
sional smile" after work, and she complains, "I can't release myself
from an artificially created elation that kept me 'up' on the trip."'0 '
In light of such findings, Hochschild recognized early on that em-
ployees who frequently pretend to feel what they do not actually
experience may suffer from a sense of falseness or hypocrisy.10 2 Or
they may modify their authentic emotions so much so that they
impair their ability to feel real emotion, depleting a part of them-
selves that is essential to individuality.' 3 Because emotions serve as
signals for how we see the world,' 4 "when we succeed in lending
our feelings to the organizational engineers of worker-customer
relations-we may pay a cost in how we hear our feelings and a cost
in what, for better or worse, they tell us about ourselves."
0 5
Accordingly, most of the literature on emotional labor addresses
its negative consequences, including drug and alcohol abuse,
headaches, absenteeism, burnout, poor self-esteem, depression,
cynicism, role alienation, and self-alienation. 6 However, a few
scholars have found that emotional labor enhances satisfaction,
security, self-esteem, self-efficacy, and task effectiveness.0 7 For in-
stance, one study describes supermarket clerks who sincerely enjoy
displaying organizationally-mandated emotions by using jokes and
other forms of entertainment.' 8 Such inconsistent results have in-
spired researchers to isolate the aspects of emotional labor
responsible for negative health outcomes. Thus, while early re-
searchers (including Hochschild) provided a limited construct of
emotional labor, assuming that it is damaging simply when requi-
site emotional displays are intense and frequent, recent
investigators have identified an additional dimension of emotional
labor that may be the true source of harm. °9
101. Id. at4.
102. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 187-88; see also Ashforth & Humphrey, su-
pra note 88, at 96-97.
103. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 187-88; see also Ashforth & Humphrey, su-
pra note 88, at 97.
104. SeeHOCHSCILD, supra note 74, at 17.
105. Id. at 21.
106. See Rebecca Abraham, Emotional Dissonance in Organizations: Antecedents, Conse-
quences, and Moderators, 124 GENETIC SOC. & GEN. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 229, 230 (1998)
(referencing studies in HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74); Susan M. Kruml & Deanna Geddes,
Catching Fire Without Burning Out: Is There an Ideal Way to Perform Emotion Labor, in EMOTIONS
IN THE WORKPLACE: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 177, 179 (Neal M. Ashkanasy et al.
eds., 2000) (listing literature addressing negative outcomes of emotion labor).
107. See Abraham, supra note 106, at 230 (referencing studies published by Martin To-
lich in 1993); Kruml & Geddes, supra note 106, at 179 (listing studies).
108. SeeAbraham, supra note 106, at 230 (referencing Tolich).
109. See id. at 230-31 (referencing studies); Zapf, supra note 76, at 241-42.
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This critical dimension is emotional dissonance, which occurs
"when an employee's expressed emotions are in conformity with
organizational norms but do not represent his or her true feel-
ings."1 ° Labor is especially intensive under such circumstances, as a
person aims to control true feelings while expressing sanctioned
emotions during interpersonal transactions.' Hochschild recog-
nized that employees are likely to experience emotional
dissonance when they surface act,' 2 but she failed to identify disso-
nance as a fundamental component of the emotional labor itself."
3
Though early examinations of emotional dissonance always con-
sidered it a consequence of emotional labor, it is now believed to be a
component of the emotional labor construct."4
Accordingly, researchers have recently posited that "the fre-
quency and variety of emotional displays may evoke positive
reactions, whereas emotional dissonance [in particular] ... may
cause dissatisfaction. "'1 For instance, organizational rules requiring
flight attendants to smile are unlikely to have adverse conse-
quences, even if applied frequently, when an employee is naturally
inclined to smile, but may cause potentially harmful emotional dis-
sonance if an employee must smile when he does not genuinely
feel cheerful. As a "form of person-role conflict between personal
and organizationally mandated emotions,"'1 6 emotional dissonance
may be a stressor with deleterious effects, including "personal
fragmentation of the self,""' 7 emotional exhaustion, job dissatisfac-
tion, and "personal and work-related maladjustment, such as poor
self-esteem, depression, cynicism, and alienation from work.""' 8
B. Emotional Labor for Lawyers
Flight attendants are among a variety of employees, ranging
from cashiers and salespeople to doctors and lawyers, who must
perform emotional labor, "the psychological processes necessary to
regulate organizationally desired emotions.""" While most sales
110. Abraham, supra note 106, at 231.
111. See Morris & Feldman, supra note 85, at 259.
112. See Kruml & Geddes, supra note 106, at 178.
113. See Zapf, supra note 76, at 241-42; see alsoAbraham, supra note 106, at 230.
114. Morris & Feldman, supra note 85, at 259.
115. Abraham, supra note 106, at 230.
116. Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 241.
118. Ashforth & Humphrey, supra note 88, at 96-97; see also Zapf, supra note 76, at 245.
119. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 244, 246-51 tbls.1-4; Zapf, supra note 76, at
238-39.
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workers, managers, and administrators perform some emotion
work, only certain jobs in the professions, service work, and clerical
work seem to involve significant amounts of emotional labor. Law-
yers make their mark as occupants of a profession high in
emotional labor.12 Accordingly, lawyers are vulnerable to the costs
of emotional labor discussed above and should become the subject
of relevant empirical work.
1. Feeling Rules for Lawyers: Act Zealous, Feel Detached
Feeling rules for lawyers may vary to some degree across organi-
zations. However, this Article focuses on what professional norms
instruct lawyers to do with their emotions, rather than on how spe-
cific organizations communicate these norms. As discussed in Part
II, the legal establishment expects lawyers to represent their clients
with zeal. While "zeal" is not in the set of emotions-happiness,
fear, anger, sadness, disgust-commonly regarded as fundamental,
and is not easily associated with one outward expression (e.g., a
smile), it evokes images of passionate, fervent advocacy that are
inextricably linked with various forms of emotional display. Accord-
ingly, while rules drafters might argue that "zeal" says less about
requisite emotional displays than it does about the level of com-
mitment a lawyer must devote to her client's cause, it would be
difficult for them to deny that the nature of the lawyer's task car-
ries with it the expectation that this "zeal" will be conveyed to
clients, judges, juries, and other lawyers. A lawyer appearing to dis-
trust her client, or to detest the client's cause, will not be
particularly effective in a negotiation or courtroom appearance. In
fact, certain norms have developed for displaying zeal in advocacy.
Jennifer Pierce has provided an empirical account of how litiga-
tors, driven by the profession's goal of zealous advocacy, "make use
of their emotions to persuade juries, judges, and witnesses in the
courtroom and in depositions, in communications with opposing
counsel, and with clients." 2' Her research demonstrates that law-
yers' emotion work reaches beyond their interactions with clients
alone. Upon observing lawyers in training at The National Institute
of Trial Advocacy (NITA) and litigators at two large San Francisco
law firms, Pierce concluded that they perform emotional labor by
120. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 245,246-47 tbls.1-2.
121. Jennifer Pierce, Rambo Litigators: Emotional Labor in a Aale-Dominated Occupation, in
MASCULINITIES IN ORGANIZATIONS 1, 2 (Cliff Cheng ed., 1996).
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using intimidation, as well as "strategic friendliness," in the course
of these various interactions. 1
2
Trial lawyers are trained "to intimidate, scare, or emotionally
bully the witness or opposing counsel into submission., 123 For in-
stance, NITA instructors teach lawyers "how to act mean" and
aggressive, even coaching them to evoke actual feelings of anger in
themselves, so that they have an intimidating effect during cross-
examination.
4
At the same time, according to one NITA teacher, "[1]awyers
have to be able to vary their styles [and] ... to have multiple
speeds, personalities and styles."" Under certain circumstances,
lawyers are thought to garner more influence by acting nice, po-
lite, or dumb.1 26 During the course of one seminar, the same trial-
lawyer-in-training may be scolded for being too nice, or too stern,
depending on the exercise.Y
Displays of zeal surely take other, unstudied forms, as well. For
instance, just as flight attendants must smile to make their passen-
gers feel safe, lawyers must act zealous to assure their clients that
they are receiving adequate representation. In a recent study, male
inmates were asked to describe the qualities of their ideal defense
attorney.1 28 They ranked "loyalty," in the form of "totally commit-
ted" and aggressive representation, as their most valued attorney
characteristic. 2 9 This Article in no way means to suggest that de-
fendants deserve anything less than effective representation.
However, it is important to recognize that there can be significant
emotional labor involved in displaying zeal (whether before the
client or in court) on behalf of a defendant who, for example, the
lawyer knows has committed a particularly heinous crime.
Rather than highlighting the psychological risk to litigators,
Pierce exclusively portrays litigators as the problem-growing up to
become con men who manipulate emotions to win cases that are
not fully defensible on the basis of reason. 2 She omits the possibil-
ity that lawyers suffer in the process of integrating professional
rules and norms that teach them the same lesson that airlines
122. Id. at 2-3, 7.
123. Id. at 9.
124. Id. at 10.
125. Id. at 16.
126. Id.
127. Seeid. at 11,20-21.
128. See Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. Brodsky, Characteristics of the Ideal Criminal De-
fense Attorney from the Client's Perspective: Empirical Findings and Implications for Legal Practice, 25
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 95-97 (2001).
129. Id. at 98.
130. SeePierce, supra note 121, at 4-5.
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teach flight attendants: manage your natural emotions in order to
provide that requisite service. For lawyers, this service is zealous
advocacy. And when their personal feelings are in conflict with the
mandatory displays of zeal (because zeal, perhaps in distorting the
truth or causing a negative externality, seems immoral), they must
work as hard, if not harder-and are susceptible to psychological
costs as high, if not higher-as the flight attendant forcing a smile
for his aggressive or arrogant passenger.
The lawyer's labor is potentially compounded by the fact that
she must go beyond acting friendly to a repugnant client, to acting
zealous in transactions with others to further this client's interests.
So she deals not only with the fact that she is, metaphorically
speaking, "faking a smile," but also with the nagging concern that
she may be creating injustices through her advocacy efforts, despite
natural inclinations to the contrary. While, admittedly, injustice is
an ambiguous concept, it remains psychologically significant that
lawyers must routinely surrender their personal notions of justice
to a zealous advocacy requirement that embraces only the intangi-
ble and uncertain justice of the adversarial system-and that this
process can hurt. Furthermore, at times, lawyers' discomfort may
reflect the moral shortcomings of the professional rules of con-
duct. Accordingly, the special societal consequences attending the
lawyer's role have implications for addressing the problems of
emotional labor.1
3
'
Rules of feeling for lawyers do not stop at zealous advocacy. Law-
yers are also expected to maintain a seemingly contradictory inner
existence, in the form of professional detachment. As described in
Part II, professional standards recognize detachment as enabling
lawyers to hold personal views (that can translate into emotional
sentiments), which might otherwise be in tension with their cli-
ents' interests, without undercutting their zeal.' Presumably, if a
lawyer feels naturally zealous about a case, the rules do not be-
grudge her that. However, if there is a conflict between a lawyer's
inner feelings and her outer displays, she is to detach so that the
former does not interfere with the latter. The processes underlying
emotion work suggest that such detachment may be harder to
achieve than it seems, and worse yet, that it may hinder lawyers
and, ultimately, undermine their ethical judgment. 3
131. See infra Part IV.
132. SeesupraPart II.
133. See infra Part [V.A. 1-2.
[VOL. 42:1
Lauyer as Emotional Laborer
2. Emotional Labor Costs for Lawyers
Given the evidence that lawyers are in poor mental health and
professionally dissatisfied at high rates,1 34 it is particularly worth-
while to explore the impact of emotional dissonance-this most
troubling aspect of emotional labor-on their well-being. By focus-
ing on the potential conflict between personal feelings and the
required zealous displays inherent to legal practice, this Article
captures lawyers' susceptibility to emotional dissonance and its psy-
chological costs."' No matter how fervently professional rules and
norms insist that lawyers separate their personal identities from
their professional ones, in situations where lawyers' experienced
emotions do not mesh with their prescribed role, emotional disso-
nance may emerge as a consequence of surface acting.
Emotional dissonance can originate from "faking in good faith"
or "faking in bad faith"-two versions of surface acting mentioned
in Part III.A.3-which may cause different health outcomes. 6 Em-
ployees faking in good faith accept the norms of prescribed
behavior even though their true feelings do not always match
them, whereas those faking in bad faith fundamentally reject these
norms (e.g., "employees who think that 'pasting on a smile' should
not be part of their jobs") .1 A lawyer who finds a particular case
troubling may fake in good faith because she believes in the impor-
tance of providing zealous representation under all circumstances
in an adversary system, whereas a lawyer faking in bad faith may
believe the zealous advocacy requirement to be distastefully rigid
and unqualified.
The mental health impact of faking in good faith likely depends
on the circumstances. Hochschild found that flight attendants who
fake cheerfulness in good faith, while harboring contempt for par-
ticular passengers, are harmed because of the estrangement
between their felt and expressed emotions."" Meanwhile, research-
ers have identified settings where faking in good faith protects
workers from burnout. 9 For example, health service workers are
said to cope with burnout by acting concerned about their
134. See supra Part 1, pp. 144-45.
135. Some lawyers may feel that they advance causes that they sincerely embrace, and
therefore experience emotional consonance rather than dissonance. This symbiosis between
lawyer and purpose is a beautiful thing, but the focus of this Article is that which causes
lawyers distress.
136. Abraham, supra note 106, at 231; see also supra Part III.A.3 (explaining the terms).
137. Abraham, supra note 106, at 231; see also Anat Rafaeli & Robert I. Sutton, Expression
of Emotion as Part of the Work Role, 12 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 23, 32 (1987).
138. Rafaeli & Sutton, supra note 137, at 23, 32.
139. See id. at 32-33; see also Abraham, supra note 106, at 231.
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terminally ill patients, while actually allowing themselves to feel
emotionally detached. 140 Either these are competing findings, or
perhaps they suggest that faking in good faith only reduces stress
when it helps an employee cope with emotions that are felt too
deeply (e.g., detachment could prevent burnout otherwise in-
duced by devotion to terminally ill patients) .41
Without additional empirical research, it is difficult to say what
these findings mean for lawyers who fake in good faith. It seems
obvious, however, that there is a fundamental difference between
what a health service worker experiences in watching a patient die,
and what a lawyer experiences in advocating toward morally ques-
tionable ends. Even if both professionals internalize the behavioral
norms of their professions, there is an intuitive disparity between
the following two scenarios: 1) acting concerned while actually
maintaining some distance from a dying patient, so as to protect
oneself from the loss (or even emotionally detaching from a rude
patient, so as to keep from taking the verbal attacks too person-
ally); and 2) detaching from one's own conscience-which signals
that one may be promoting an injustice-in order to advocate
zealously for a client. The mental health of the lawyer, who may
find herself affirmatively promoting some bad end as a result of
this detachment from her conscience, would seem more likely
compromised than that of the health service worker, whose main
goal is to protect herself without making a discernable negative
impact on the universe. 42 The distinction between the use of de-
tachment in medicine and law, and an abbreviated role for
detachment in coping with emotional dissonance, are explored
further in Part IV.A.2.
Research indicates that faking in bad faith, which represents a
clash between personal values and role requirements, is a clear
threat to employee well-being.' 43 Employees who comply with dis-
play rules in bad faith may experience "strong feelings of
duplicity," while those who resist may receive significant "organiza-
tional pressure to conform." 4 Thus, under current professional
norms, lawyers who reject the values of partisanship and non-
accountability, perceiving them to be in conflict with some other
valued identity, face the greatest psychological risk. Such lawyers
140. See Rafaeli & Sutton, supra note 137, at 32-33; see also Abraham, supra note 106, at
231.
141. SeeRafaeli &Sutton, supra note 137, at 33; see alsoAbraham, supra note 106, at 231.
142. See infra Part IV.A.2 (exploring both the distinction between the use of detachment
in medicine and law and the role detachment plays in coping with emotional dissonance).
143. See Rafaeli & Sutton, supra note 137, at 32; Abraham, supra note 106, at 231-32.
144. Abraham, supra note 106, at 232.
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may not be few and far between, perhaps believing that advocacy
should be public interest-oriented rather than strictly client-
oriented, or that zealous advocacy should only stretch so far as the
bounds of morality.
3. Applicability of Research Findings to Lawyers
Most of the existing empirical research on emotional labor fo-
cuses on service workers. Although the principal results should
apply to lawyers as well, it is important to study lawyers specifically
to avoid overgeneralizing prior findings. 45 One reason for caution
is the possibility that "prestigious positions offer status shields for
workers," enabling doctors, lawyers, and other professionals to
cope more easily with emotional labor than service workers who do
not answer to themselves.' 46 Such a theory is consistent with re-
search findings, discussed in Part V.C, that greater autonomy leads
to less dissonance. Of course, zealous advocacy is such a fundamen-
tal component of the lawyer's role that autonomy may not fully
compensate for its emotional demands.
147
Researchers have also noted that students in professional
schools learn to keep an emotional distance from their clients,
such that they are less vulnerable than service workers to clients'
complaints, threats, and other emotional displays.' 48 "Professional
demeanor" is said to reduce professionals' emotional labor.
14 9
However, to the extent that it specifically protects professionals
against needy or abusive clients, professional demeanor still would
not necessarily alleviate emotional dissonance stemming from the
range of situations in which lawyers' personal feelings conflict with
expected displays of zealous advocacy. Whether lawyers can, or
should, professionally detach in the way the ALI suggests-to keep
their personal views separate from their professional stances-is a
separate and more complicated question, as discussed further in
Part IV.
145. See Kruml & Geddes, supra note 106, at 181 (limiting variance in their study by con-
trolling for type ofjob).
146. Barbara Stenross & Sherryl Kleinman, The Highs and Lows of Emotional Labor: Detec-
tives'Encounters with Criminals and Victims, 17J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 435,449 (1989).
147. See infra Part IV.C.
148. Stenross & Kleinman, supra note 146, at 449.
149. Id.
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IV. POTENTIAL ANTIDOTES TO THE COSTS OF LAWYERS'
EMOTIONAL LABOR-AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
The remainder of this Article uses the insights of emotional la-
bor theory to propose possible antidotes to the psychological costs
of lawyers' emotional dissonance, all the while recognizing the po-
tentially important role of dissonance as a regulator of lawyer
ethics. Assuming that, in the context of existing professional rules,
emotional dissonance provides inner caution to lawyers against
immoral acts, we may want to identify a solution that both reduces
psychological harm to lawyers and maintains this critical signaling
function. Part A suggests that performing deep acting might
better enable lawyers to circumvent emotional dissonance than
detachment and surface acting; Part B encourages individuals to
self-select into the legal profession, as well as particular work envi-
ronments, by first considering their personal susceptibility to
emotional dissonance; and Part C makes the most radical proposal
of all-to modify the zealous advocacy prong of the lawyer's role,
so that lawyers may avoid emotional dissonance through greater
moral autonomy. Arguably, this third suggestion is the only one of
the three that reduces emotional dissonance without compromis-
ing lawyer ethics.
A. Deep Acting
Although lawyers will always have to contend with a certain
amount of emotional labor given the nature of their jobs, it may be
possible to reduce such labor and its costs. One way for lawyers to
avoid the psychological strain of emotion work may be to perform
deep acting, rather than to detach and, by inference, perform sur-
face acting like professional standards currently prescribe. This
may seem obvious, since surface acting leads to emotional disso-
nance and dissonance, in turn, causes psychological harm.
However, deep acting requires emotional effort that theoretically
could be damaging as well. In fact, Hochschild argues that,
whether the method of expressing emotion according to feeling
rules is surface or deep acting, a sense bf estrangement might re-
sult because deep acting requires "conscious mental work ... [,]
keep[ing] the feeling that I conjure up from being part of 'my-
self.' 050
150. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 36.
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Notwithstanding Hochschild's observation, a recent study of ser-
vice employees, measuring whether the method of emotional
labor-either surface acting, associated with high emotional disso-
nance, or deep acting, associated with high effort-results in
different psychological outcomes, reinforces the notion that sur-
face acting does have uniquely detrimental effects.' 5' More
specifically, the findings indicate the following: 1) surface acting,
or greater dissonance, is correlated with greater emotional exhaus-
tion, dissatisfaction with job accomplishments, negative or cynical
attitudes toward customers, and less job involvement; while 2) deep
acting, or greater emotive effort, is correlated with less emotional
exhaustion, greater satisfaction with job accomplishments, less
negativity toward customers, and greaterjob involvement. 52
The interplay between emotional labor and social identity the-
ory may help to explain why deep acting reduces psychological
strain. Social identity theorists believe that "individuals who
strongly identify with their organizational roles ... -that is, indi-
viduals who regard their roles as a central, salient, and valued
component of who they are-are apt to feel most authentic when
they are conforming to role expectations, including display rules.', 3
The perception that one is acting contrary to a valued identity in
conforming to display rules prompts emotional dissonance and
self-alienation-not the acting per se, for sometimes acting allows a
person to adopt a treasured identity.14 When emotions are in-
volved, individuals have a harder time distancing themselves from
the positions they assume because emotions "provide strong cues
for the construction of identity .... "' Since deep acting involves
changing one's felt emotion, it is likely to lead more quickly to
identification with the role than surface acting.' 56 Accordingly, over
time, deep acting may foster a sense of authenticity.
The above-mentioned findings suggest that, through deep act-
ing, lawyers may reduce the psychological strain of their role as
zealous advocate. Meanwhile, professional rules counsel the oppo-
site, urging lawyers to invoke detachment strategies when they do
not naturally feel zealous about a case or client. 57 In essence, the
legal profession is instructing lawyers to fake zeal if necessary, when
instead it could be encouraging them to align their true emotions
151. See Kruml & Geddes, supra note 106, at 178-79.
152. See id. at 182-83.
153. Ashforth & Humphrey, supra note 88, at 98.
154. See id. at 99.
155. Id. at 101.
156. See id. at 101, 104.
157. See supra Part II.A., pp. 146-52.
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with requisite zealous displays, in pursuit of better mental health
outcomes. NITA instructors may be on to something when they
coach their trainees to evoke actual feelings within themselves, so
as to produce the intended effects on witnesses and opposing
counsel.
Additional research is obviously required before we can con-
clude with confidence that the legal profession should
wholeheartedly embrace deep acting. However, as a start, open dis-
cussion about the utility of deep acting may encourage lawyers to
share their emotional labor concerns. Research indicates that emo-
tional support from coworkers may reverse the harmful effects of
emotional dissonance.158 To facilitate access to such support, the
legal profession must move beyond the assumption that all lawyers
can carry out their roles, according to the standard conception,
without psychological angst. As long as emotional dissonance is
considered everyone else's problem, lawyers will feel uncomfort-
able seeking help.
Further, a balanced dialogue about deep acting must acknowl-
edge several important caveats to its potential utility.
1. Caveat # 1: Deep Acting as a Cause of Emotional Dissonance
First, one worries about the theoretical possibility that deep act-
ing produces its own form of emotional dissonance, different from
the unease emerging when someone must feign an emotion that
she does not feel according to display rules. In studying Dutch
teachers, researchers have identified a form of emotional disso-
nance where "the uneasy feeling emerges immediately as a result of
an emotional experience ... [that] is evaluated as threatening the
individual's identity., 15 9 For instance, a teacher instinctively may
feel angry when a student who normally lags behind continues to
perform poorly. 16° In response to this anger, he may experience a
second feeling in the form of dissonance-"the result of a swift,
and tacit, evaluation of the anger experience"-because he identi-
fies as being a supportive teacher, and supportive teachers are not
supposed to become angry under such circumstances.61
Thus, it seems plausible that a lawyer who sees herself as objec-
tive and sincere may experience dissonance similar to that of the
angry teacher if she deep acts her way into a sensation of zealous-
158. See Abraham, supra note 106, at 235-36, 242-43.
159. Jansz & Timmers, supra note 90, at 87.
160. See id. at 79.
161. Id. at 80.
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ness in a case that would normally seem repugnant, or even just
borderline, to her. While the other research findings suggest that
the psychological strain of surface acting, nonetheless, outweighs
that of deep acting, we might question the ease with which a shift
in identity occurs in light of this additional dissonance theory, and
in light of Hochschild's belief that deep acting produces self-
alienation.
Even so, the Dutch study does not suggest that a norm of de-
tachment is the answer either. Emotional dissonance like that
experienced by the Dutch teachers introduces the possibility that a
lawyer who generally embraces the standard conception of the law-
yer's role, but nonetheless experiences emotional dissonance in
situations that conflict with her moral compass, may suffer an iden-
tity crisis to boot because of the professional detachment mandate.
That is, she may start to question her identity of devoted advocate
if she finds herself incapable of achieving the detachment pre-
scribed by her profession. The legal profession's detachment
prescription may be inherently problematic for conflicted lawyers
who generally internalize the profession's norms.
2. Caveat # 2: Defense Mechanisms-Detachment, After All?
A second caveat is the importance of recognizing that certain
forms of detachment-significantly more limited in scope than
professional standards prescribe-theoretically may complement
deep acting as effective coping mechanisms for lawyers. Instead of
ultimately identifying with their professional role to alleviate the
emotional discrepancies that cause dissonance and self-alienation,
individuals may employ a range of behavioral and cognitive de-
fense mechanisms.6 On the behavioral front, social workers have
been shown to avoid dissonance by routinizing their relationships
with clients in a manner that spares them the need to express un-
felt empathy and concern.63 Meanwhile, employing cognitive
distancing tactics, "psychiatric emergency teams [have] preserved a
desired identity as benevolent caregivers by using derogatory labels
to characterize situations where they were forced to physically re-
strain or coerce patients .... ,"6'
Arguably, such selected detachment strategies may offer a partial
answer to lawyers struggling with emotional discrepancies, as long
162. See Ashforth & Humphrey, supra note 88, at 104-05.
163. See id. at 104.
164. Id. at 104-05.
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as they are not invoked to the extreme that Postema cautions
against.' 65 For instance, researchers have suggested that Nazi doc-
tors cognitively insulated themselves from the emotional
discrepancies attending the extermination of human beings, par-
ticularly in light of their Hippocratic Oath of caregiving, by
invoking "psychological numbing" techniques. 166 Such defense
mechanisms create a "boundary between one's central identity and
the undesired identity implied by one's role behavior"6 7 to protect
the valued self and to forestall the dangers of emotional labor and
the pressure for identity realignment. It goes without saying that
we do not want lawyers wreaking havoc on society through the kind
of psychological numbing tactics employed by Nazi doctors. How-
ever, behavioral defense mechanisms like those used by social
workers may be appropriate under certain circumstances, such as
when a lawyer is attempting to cope with a client who seeks an in-
ordinate amount of attention. Moreover, perhaps some cognitive
distancing is justified when a lawyer must, like the psychiatric
emergency teams, perform a difficult act toward a necessary end.
Along these lines, in some cases, for instance, when a client re-
ceives the death penalty, a lawyer may benefit from faking in good
faith to protect herself from the loss,'8 as did the health service
workers mentioned in Part III.B.2.
A distinction between the task of lawyer and doctor may clarify
where the utility of detachment ends in legal practice. When a doc-
tor distances herself to cope with the loss of her terminally ill
patient, she may be employing what has been termed "detached
concern," characterized by "internal emotional neutrality and, at
the same time, external display of moderate emotions."6 9 Such a
process is the product of "occupational feeling rules ... that com-
prise both the inner feelings and the expression of emotions
whereby the inner feelings have to deviate from the expressed
emotions.', 7' The larger notion underlying detached concern is
that doctors ought to be sufficiently detached to exercise objective
medical judgment and simultaneously able to provide patients with
the sensitivity they require. 7'
165. See supra Part lI.B.
166. Ashforth & Humphrey, supra note 88, at 105.
167. Id.
168. Cf supra Part Ill.B.2 (health service workers).
169. Zapf, supra note 76, at 246.
170. Id.
171. Nancy R_ Angoff, Making a Place for Emotions in Medicine, 2 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L.
& ETics 447,447 (2002) (book review).
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Certainly the value of detachment in medical care is a disputable
and complex proposition, but this aside, detached concern pro-
vides an interesting source of comparison with display rules for
lawyers.1 72 Like doctors, lawyers are told to express one thing (zeal-
ous advocacy), and to feel another (professional detachment).
However, while doctors are to remain detached in the name of ob-
jectivity, lawyers are to do so in the name of partisanship. The
former aspiration engages doctors in identifying and furthering
the best outcome for their patients, while the latter relegates the
best outcome to the adversarial system, as if to say that lawyers are
merely agents of that system. Accordingly, lawyers are instructed to
use detachment, not to weigh all information in order to arrive at a
balanced judgment, but to block out emotional cues pointing
against their clients' interests, even if these interests seem unjust.
In reality, it may be quite difficult for a lawyer with a healthy con-
science to consider herself a mere agent when her feelings signal
that she is about to further an unjust outcome. More fundamen-
tally, when a lawyer feels that she is about to act immorally, it may
be difficult for her to maintain an allegiance to professional norms
of largely unqualified zealous advocacy and non-accountability.
Thus, it is unclear how much detachment the average lawyer
could actually muster in the face of such emotional dissonance and
how much detachment society should stand for when a lawyer
questions the morality of her actions. Do we want to eliminate
healthy self-doubt as a check on professional conduct? And since
defense mechanisms are facilitated by the "support of management
or the legitimation of an occupational subculture," do we want the
legal profession to endorse professional detachment or non-
accountability across the board, without qualification? 17 3 I would
argue not.
3. Caveat # 3: Diminishing Lawyer Ethics
Along the same lines, the third, and perhaps most important,
caveat is that endorsing lawyers' use of deep acting essentially
means urging them to morph their identities in the name of self-
protection, and at the expense of the potentially important signal-
ing function of emotional dissonance. One can see why the legal
profession would encourage detachment as a coping mechanism
for inner conflict when explicitly asking people to realign their
172. See id. at 448.
173. Ashforth & Humphrey, supra note 88, at 105.
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identities to match their professional roles is a tough sell. Also,
there is a concern that greater identification with the role of
zealous advocate, while reducing psychological strain, might (like
detachment) simultaneously make lawyers more comfortable act-
ing immorally. Assuming that professional rules do not place
sufficient ethical limits on lawyer conduct, perhaps the psychologi-
cal strain of emotional dissonance serves to stop some lawyers from
acting immorally and thereby functions as a necessary check on
professional conduct. In this sense, the emotional labor of a lawyer
ought not be compared loosely to that of a cashier, who generally
does not stand to do the same kind of societal damage through
identification with her role.
Alternatively, perhaps greater identification with the role would
make it more difficult for the average decent lawyer to embrace
excessively zealous behaviors that border on the immoral because
she would be less able to disassociate such actions from her very
being. Under this theory, greater identification may be associated
with greater moral obligation of the Luban variety. Additional em-
pirical research on deep acting for lawyers might help to
determine which effect is more likely.
Further research is imperative because, assuming that lawyers on
the whole follow their profession's feeling rules, the status quo may
eventually lead them to identify with overzealous acts that once
made them uneasy for good reason. Despite the proven psycho-
logical costs of surface acting, researchers have suggested that the
resulting emotional dissonance may have a self-regulating function.
Over time, like deep acting, even surface acting may provide the
internal pressure necessary to realign identity, and thereby inte-
grate feeling and expression.74 For instance, research has
"described both the inauthenticity felt by student nurses when they
initially enacted their instructors' conception of the nursing role
and the way in which the associated feelings of guilt and hypocrisy
helped motivate the students to gradually internalize the role." 75
Furthermore, the very act of publicly expressing emotion may in-
duce a change in felt emotion and may make the person feel
committed to her public persona, particularly if she comes to be
treated as an exemplar of that role.76
The notion that what might be a useful signaling function, if left
unbridled, may ultimately pressure lawyers into internalizing mor-
ally questionable roles that they did not originally embrace is
174. See id. at 101-02.
175. Id. at 102.
176. See id.
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troubling for professional ethics. In fact, it has been argued that
professional values have declined because lawyers have resolved
their "moral ambiguity" by shifting their own values. 1 7 Thus, our
failure to thoroughly explore the emotional labor of lawyering may
place professional ethics in significant danger.
B. Self-Selection
A lawyer's ability to withstand emotional dissonance healthfully
may depend on her personality. 7 8 Thus, to mitigate the costs of
emotional labor, we may want to teach college students to consider
their personalities before electing to pursue the law, and encour-
age law students as well as practicing lawyers to select work
environments most suitable to their particular psychological needs.
Research suggests that individuals who are extroverted and
flexible suffer less tension and become more sociable in high-
conflict situations. 9 Accordingly, they may more readily rely on
social support, which is an effective coping strategy for emotional
dissonance.'80 In addition, researchers have identified a need for
empirical work on the role of thinking styles in moderating the
relationship between emotional dissonance and psychological
strain.""
Moreover, researchers have hypothesized that "individuals may
be better suited for their positions when there is convergence be-
tween the expected emotional expression on their jobs and their
own predisposition to experience the same type of emotions. ""'
For example, people who experience positive emotions more often
than negative ones will suffer less frequent dissonance in ajob that
requires the display of positive emotion.'13 Since, as Pierce argues,
lawyers must engage in both hostility and strategic friendliness to
perform zealous advocacy,8 4 it is difficult to say how this rule of af-
fectivity applies to lawyers' comfort in their roles. Additional
empirical research on affectivity and the lawyer role may help
counsel individuals on whether to enter the field of law in the first
place.
177. Daicoff, supra note 18, at 561-62.
178. See Abraham, supra note 106, at 243.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Morris & Feldman, supra note 80, at 1000.
183. See id.
184. See supra Part III.B.1.
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A lawyer predisposed to the standard conception of her profes-
sional role may also cope better with emotional dissonance. The
discussion, in Part IV.A., about the role of identity in emotional
dissonance185 suggests that people who naturally internalize the
norms of the legal profession and value them as a central part of
identity will have better psychological outcomes under a wider ar-
ray of ambiguous professional circumstances. That is, a person who
identifies with advocating zealously over, say, reserving judgment in
the name of measured objectivity, will likely feel more comfortable
in her lawyer role than a person who identifies primarily with ob-
jective reasoning. Therefore, if our goal is a healthier profession,
and if the psychological costs of lawyering prove to depend largely
on the personalities of individual lawyers, we might focus on teach-
ing college students self-awareness during the career selection
process.
Of course, reliance on conscious self-selection into the legal pro-
fession as an antidote to emotional dissonance poses ethical risks
similar to those discussed in the context of deep acting and de-
tachment. As a result of guided self-selection, conceivably those
individuals who would have been most troubled by the profession's
immoral over-zealousness-and who otherwise might have pro-
vided a check on professional conduct-will opt out of the legal
profession. In addition, constructing a profession comprised of a
particular type of thinker could stifle creative solutions to complex
problems. Does the profession need sacrificial lambs to serve as
monitors of ethics and problem-solving practices? Perhaps, though
it is unclear that lawyers experiencing emotional dissonance feel
they have the discretion to effectively halt immoral professional
conduct under current standards.
We might therefore prefer to focus on the self-selection into ap-
propriate work environments of those relatively diverse individuals
already in the legal profession. Given that "[t]he vast majority of
law students-at least the vast majority of those attending the more
prestigious schools (or getting good grades at the less prestigious
schools)-want to work in big firms," it seems unlikely that they are
giving due attention to their personal needs in the emotional labor
department. 18 6 Even though large law firm environments may vary
to some degree, this herd mentality suggests that law students are
not individualizing their choices enough to attend adequately to
emotional labor concerns. Counteracting such a tendency is no
easy task, particularly if the principle of detachment permeates le-
185. See discussion supra Part MA
186. Schiltz, supra note 16, at 896-97.
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gal education to the point that graduating students lose touch with
what they feel and therefore no longer know how to follow their
hearts. Legal educators, however, owe their students the opportunity
to grapple with these issues early on in their law school careers.
In particular, we might address emotional dissonance by urging
law students and practicing lawyers to seek work environments that
enable them to exercise their consciences through job autonomy.
A study of customer service representatives in the telecommunica-
tions, entertainment, food service, and clothing retail industries
indicates that job autonomy reduces emotional dissonance.1 8 ' Em-
ployees with greater "freedom, independence, and discretion in
performing job tasks" likely enjoy greater discretion in modifying
display rules to better match their experienced emotions and
thereby experience less emotional dissonance.18 Assuming, of
course, that lawyers suffering from emotional dissonance feel a
drive toward greater morality than professional standards facilitate,
autonomy would enable them to make more ethical choices in ex-
ercising their professional roles.
At first glance, increased job autonomy may not seem like a vi-
able response to emotional dissonance because, while lawyers tend
to have more control over their jobs than service workers, profes-
sional norms are rather strong and transcend both the office
environment and lawyer-client interactions. For instance, all litiga-
tors, no matter their sense of autonomy in the office, must argue
with zeal in court where they are monitored by judge, jury, client,
and opposing counsel. And transactional lawyers, even those who
generally feel autonomous in their interactions with clients, know
the distress of pushing for unreasonable client demands at the ne-
gotiating table.
Nonetheless, the ability of a lawyer to select cases and strategies
could make her representations in court and elsewhere feel rela-
tively authentic. Accordingly, a lawyer might choose to work for an
organization that modifies display norms by enabling employees to
decline cases that cause substantial emotional dissonance or to
handle cases in a justice-oriented fashion. If more lawyers begin to
demand such job autonomy, the legal market might shift in re-
sponse and thereby indirectly change the shape of the zealous
advocacy requirement. Of course, while autonomy may resolve a
lawyer's most fundamental inner conflicts, it will not attend to the
inevitable attorney-client issues that can raise emotional labor con-
187. See Abraham, supra note 106, at 232-33, 242.
188. Id. at 232.
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cerns. Eliminating emotional labor entirely is neither the goal nor
a viable option.
More fundamentally, a lawyer may exercise her autonomy and
enhance her emotional consonance by opting in the first instance
to work for an organization with a fitting ideological perspective.
In so doing, she is likely to minimize the need to decline cases in
the course of her employment in order to protect her psychologi-
cal well-being.
C. Moral Autonomy and the Lawyer's Professional Role
Since deep acting, detachment, and some forms of self-selection
into the legal profession theoretically result in identification with
morally problematic (extremely zealous) stances, self-selection into
positions of greater autonomy may be a preferable solution to law-
yers' emotional dissonance. Unfortunately, the autonomy described
above is likely to develop only in pockets of the legal profession and
thereby to help only a small percentage of lawyers who must con-
tinue nonetheless to contend with looming standards of professional
conduct. If empirical research shows that lawyers experience high
levels of emotional dissonance when forced to serve as unqualified
zealous advocates, we may want to reexamine the standard concep-
tion of the lawyer's role in order to achieve both a widespread
decrease in emotional labor and to better align professional conduct
with morality. A fundamental shift in the standard conception of the
lawyer's role toward greater moral autonomy may be more broadly
and uniformly effective, even if less viable.
Many of us accept the requirements of the legal profession at face
value, but alternative models of lawyering are conceivable and might
address some of the psychological risks of zealous advocacy. As dis-
cussed in Part II, Simon (much like Luban) describes the Dominant
View of lawyering ethics as requiring lawyers to pursue any client
goal through any arguably legal means, regardless of the impact on
the public or other third parties.1 89 However, Simon presents alterna-
tive approaches to lawyering as well. For instance, the "Public
Interest View" urges that the law be applied in accordance with its
substantive purposes, mandating disclosure of certain relevant in-
formation that the Dominant View counsels lawyers to conceal,
rejecting the "manipulation of form in ways that defeat relevant le-
gal purposes," and eliminating the use of procedure in ways that
189. See supra Part II.A.
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frustrate substantive norms.'9° Nonetheless, Simon does not see the
Public Interest View as a panacea for lawyers' moral anxiety because,
like the Dominant View, it adopts "categorical" decisionmaking
which restricts the range of considerations that the lawyer may take
into account in the face of a particular problem." Thus, categorical
decisionmaking denies the decisionmaker the discretion to consider
unspecified factors, or specified factors in unspecified ways.1
9 2
Simon instead promotes a "Contextual View" of ethical deci-
sionmaking, whereby "the lawyer should take such actions as,
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem
likely to promote justice." 93 He recognizes that some believe the
application of abstract norms such as 'justice" to be arbitrary, but
responds that, in contexts like judicial and prosecutorial decision-
making, "lawyers typically insist strenuously on the plausibility of
rational, grounded, discretionary judgment.' 94 "Decisions about
justice [under the Contextual View] are not assertions of personal
preferences, nor are they applications of ordinary morality."'9
Rather, a lawyer operating under this paradigm is to think about
such decisions as if she were a judge, without focusing exclusively
on substance or working only to advance the claims and goals that
she believes ought to prevail when actual judges, juries, and execu-
tive officials are able to make more reliable determinations about
the merits than she is as an individual lawyer. 6 However, "the less
reliable the relevant procedures and institutions, the more direct
-ub-'-n,1" - "97
responsibility she needs to assume for substantive justice.. Thus,
under the Contextual View, the lawyer is to adopt a set of practices
that, in the vein of the Public Interest View, "facilitate the presenta-
tion of relevant information and forego deception and
manipulation."9 8 These practices should be adjustable in cases
where they do not furtherjust resolutions.' 99
First and foremost, under the Contextual View, the lawyer should
try to mitigate procedural defects, only forming her own judgment
about the proper substantive resolution when she cannot correct for
these defects.2 0 A defense lawyer negotiating a settlement with a
190. SIMON, supra note 1, at 8-9.
191. Id. at 9.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 10.
195. Id. at 138.
196. See id. at 139-40.
197. Id. at 140.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
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plaintiff's lawyer who does not know that a recent statute would sub-
stantially help her client's case would have a responsibility to move
the case toward ajust result by disclosing the necessary information
because, during settlement, the defense counsel cannot rely on a
judge or jury to remedy the procedural breakdown.0' In contrast,
under the Dominant View's categorical rule of nondisclosure, in
such a case, those lawyers who entered the profession to further jus-
tice are left to suffer extreme emotional dissonance.2
Arguably, at the same time that the Contextual View helps the
justice-oriented lawyer, it forces a lawyer who instead identifies with
competitive win-loss strategies to act against her natural feelings.
This may not be a bad outcome, however, if we seek to align psy-
chological comfort with just outcomes and psychological
discomfort with unjust outcomes. If psychological strain is to drive
anyone out of the profession, perhaps it should be the lawyer who
wants to win at all costs.
Concededly, under the existing system, the defendant in the
above hypothetical would likely feel betrayed by a lawyer who ap-
pears to assist the opposing side. Such an outcome might require
defense counsel to engage in emotional labor as she works to ad-
dress her client's feelings. We should consider whether this would
be the price we are willing to pay for greater justice, at least until
client expectations shift with the incorporation of the Contextual
View into legal norms (assuming this were possible).
Second, sometimes a lawyer also has an ethical choice to make
about what Simon calls the "Purpose-versus-Form tension."20 3 For
example, such a tension arises when the lawyer impeaches a wit-
ness she knows to be truthful, or objects to hearsay she knows to be
accurate. While the Dominant View does not make the lawyer re-
sponsible for applying rules in a way that advances their purposes,
the Contextual View requires the lawyer to determine whether
purpose or form is more likely to achieve the relevant legal mer-
its. 2 14 The clearer and more fundamental the relevant purposes, the
more the lawyer is bound by them, while the less clear and more
problematic, the more justified the lawyer is in treating the rele-
vant rules formally-that is, "understanding them to permit any
client goal not plainly precluded by their language," as the Domi-
nant View prescribes.2 0 5 Accordingly, lawyers should do with rules
201. See i& at 141.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 144.
204. See id. at 144-45.
205. Id. at 146.
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what courts do with contracts and statutes: interpret them to avoid
206
unjust or unintended consequences.
Inevitably, there will be times when a lawyer experiences emo-
tional dissonance over furthering the clear purpose of a rule.
However, structuring the lawyer's role to advance legal merits
would seem, for the most part, to relieve lawyers of the feeling that
they must play the system on behalf of their clients at nearly all
costs. In theory, this should alleviate a troubling source of disso-
nance, while promoting ethical lawyering and potentially
improving the public image of lawyers.
Simon acknowledges that both the Dominant View and the Con-
textual View are aspirational in their conceptions of lawyers as
people who "care about the rightness of their conduct and [] are
motivated at least to a limited extent to behave ethically., 20 7 My ac-
count of emotional dissonance is driven by a similar view of lawyers
as individuals who want to do good, and who are susceptible to
psychological harm when they must repeatedly subordinate moral-
ity to zealous advocacy. Contextual decisionmaking may provide a
way for lawyers to exercise their autonomy through their profes-
sional role and thereby alleviate the emotional dissonance that
stems from person-role conflict.
Consistent with Simon's Contextual View, Luban concludes that
lawyers can be zealous but must also be accountable. If professional
and moral obligations conflict, the latter must prevail.2 8 If they do
not conflict, then professional obligations prevail.209 Thus, lawyers
should be zealous rather than indifferent to their clients' interests,
but there should be limits on the tactics invoked to further those
interests. '0 Luban may not realize that, in advocating for moral ac-
countability, he promotes not only professional ethics but also a
more realistic and psychologically healthier approach to lawyering.
By transforming zealous advocacy into a contoured process
through which a lawyer must seek to further just ends, the legal
profession would grant justice-oriented lawyers the flexibility to
handle professional circumstances in conformance with their per-
sonal identities. Such a model of lawyering would seem to promote
emotional consonance when it serves society best-through justice,
or at least as close as we can come to it. Hence, it would seem more
likely than our current system to draw justice-oriented lawyers into
the profession, and to keep them here, healthy and wealthy.
206. See id.
207. Id. at li.
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V. CONCLUSION
In order to shape a legal profession characterized by integrity,
pride, and job satisfaction, we must address the psychological im-
pact of professional norms on lawyers. Implicit to this discussion is
an understanding of the lawyer as more than a mere instrument of
her client or the adversary system. However, in no way does this
Article intend to undermine the importance of the lawyer's ability
to serve her client; it simply perceives this service in a more tex-
tured way, as inextricably linked with the lawyer's mental health
and the moral quality of legal practice generally.
If we determine that zealous advocacy (as currently conceived) is
worth preserving, then it may be best, on the basis of empirical find-
ings, to help lawyers achieve this frame of mind as painlessly as
possible-through deep acting or appropriate self-selection into the
profession. We may conclude, however, that psychological unease
ultimately signals over-zealous behavior and that we want to preserve
this check on professional conduct. In such a case, we should avoid
solutions that minimize dissonance, like deep acting or self-
selection, which may lead to lawyers' over-identification with zealous
advocacy. The boldest move yet-a fundamental shift in the zealous
advocacy requirement-may then be in order, if we are to safeguard
both lawyer mental health and morality in legal practice.
At the very least, the legal profession needs to engage in an
honest discussion about the emotional sacrifices, not part of the
job description, that lawyers routinely make as zealous advocates.
For, in our silence, we further the very estrangement we should be
seeking to resolve:
[W]hether the separation between "me" and my face or be-
tween "me" and my feeling counts as estrangement depends
on something else-the outer context. In the world of the
theater, it is an honorable art to make maximum use of the
resources of memory and feeling in stage performance. In
private life, the same resources can be used to advantage,
though to a lesser extent. But when we enter the world of
profit-and-loss statements, when the psychological costs of
emotional labor are not acknowledged by the company, it is
then that we look at these otherwise helpful separations of
"me" from my face and my feeling as potentially estranging."
211. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 74, at 37.
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